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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) has become a common
paradigm for different domains such as health care, trans-
portation infrastructure, smart home, smart shopping, and e-
commerce. With its interoperable functionality, it is now possible
to connect all domains of IoT together for providing competent
services to the users. Because numerous IoT devices can connect
and communicate at the same time, there can be events that
trigger conflicting actions to an actuator or an environmental
feature. However, there have been very few research efforts made
to detect conflicting situation in IoT system using formal method.
This paper provides a formal method approach, IoT Confict
Checker (IoTC2), to ensure safety of controller and actuators’
behavior with respect to conflicts. Any policy violation results in
detection of the conflicts. We defined the safety policies for con-
troller, actions, and triggering events and implemented the those
with Prolog to prove the logical completeness and soundness. In
addition to that, we have implemented the detection policies in
Matlab Simulink Environment with its built-in Model Verifica-
tion blocks. We created smart home environment in Simulink
and showed how the conflicts affect actions and corresponding
features. We have also experimented the scalability, efficiency,
and accuracy of our method in the simulated environment.
Index Terms—Internet of Things(IoT), Formal Method, Con-
flicts, Policies, Simulation, Safety, Security
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a hot
topic in the technology community. The deployment and
application of IoT devices covers a variety of fields, ranging
from the smart homes to transportation management system. It
is projected that there will be as many as 50 billion connected
devices by 2020 [1]. IoT presents a unique advantage in
that is connects devices within and across domains, e.g. smart
homes, traffic route guidance systems, shopping systems, ride
sharing, and parking management systems. IoT applications
and devices share required data and provide unified services
to the users.
However, the distributed nature of IoT leaves devices and
communication channels exposed to attackers and many of
these devices and protocols are resource-constrained. This,
combined with the fact that many of these devices receive
infrequent updates leaves them highly susceptible to attack. An
attacker can trigger an event that leads to conflicting actions for
the same object or feature of the environment. As for example,
an attacker can create multiple events that trigger a thermostat
to increase and decrease temperature of a room at the same
time. Sending two different commands in the thermostat at
the same time continuously can damage it, by artificially
shortening the devices lifespan. In this way, the attacker not
only damages an asset, but also may drive the occupants of
the room to leave due to fluctuations in the comfort level of
the room. Moreover, misconfiguration is possible as there are
numerous rules or policies for taking actions by the controllers
after events have occurred.
Attackers can leverage these conflicts and vulnerabilities to
gain physical access to a smart building. For example, an at-
tacker may compromise a carbon monoxide sensor and falsely
trigger the alarm indicating the presence of carbon monoxide,
which in turn sends a command to the smart windows to open
allowing fresh air into the building. Occupants may confuse
the CO alarm with a fire alarm and leave the building. A
thief can target the opened windows to enter the building.
In addition to the attacks described above, an attacker can
create series of attacks (cascading attack) [2]. Even with IoT
technology in the early stages of development and deployment,
the guarantees of maintaining safe and secure operation of an
environment through IoT devices can attract more users. Even
legacy, or dumb devices can be attached to the system and be
operated through a controller.
Due to the limited computational and memory capacities
of IoT devices, it is not always possible to secure and
monitor each and every device and communication channel. A
controller or a group of controllers provide the computational
and storage capacity to make decisions based on events coming
from the edge devices (i.e. sensors) and issue commands
to the appropriate actuators. The automated decisions made
by a controller may try to command a device which is
already performing a different action. Moreover, devices will
be connecting to the IoT controller intermittently. Events can
occur any time or an attacker can force specific events to
happen in order to take advantage of misconfigurations (i.e.
rule conflicts) in the IoT system. Furthermore, the operational
policies for an IoT system can change over time based on the
requirements of the building and its occupants. Hence, it is
important to check whether a recently triggered event causes
a conflict based on the ruleset that is stored in the controllers.
In this research, we propose IoTC2, a formal methods
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approach to ensure safety properties for the controllers and
actuators in an IoT system. The main contributions of the paper
are:
• a formal approach to defining the safety properties of an
IoT system
• a technique for detecting conflicts within the rulesets of
the IoT system that violate the safety properties of the
system
• an implementation of IoTC2 that can be used in real-time
to ensure the safety of the IoT system
It should be noted that the actuation commands are issued
from the controllers. Hence, multiple controllers that try to
command the same actuator are in scope for this work.
IoTC2 has all the rules/logic for the IoT system so that when
events trigger a rule or a set of rules, IoTC2 makes sure
the safety properties are maintained. When a violation occurs
of the safety properties occurs it is due to conflicts in the
rules defined for the system. It is also worth noting that the
developed framework is capable of detecting conflicts that are
caused by misconfiguration of operational rules. The conflicts
are detected even before the conflicting actions take place.
IoTC2 is capable identifying the specific type of violation that
has occurred. We have also implemented an IoT environment
simulation in Matlab’s Simulink environment to understand
the impact of conflicts in an IoT system.
II. IOTC2 FRAMEWORK
A basic IoT system is comprised of a number of sensors,
actuators, and controllers. The sensors collect measurements
of the current state of the environment or the system. There
are operational rules stored in the controller. These rules are
triggered based on events collected by the sensors. The rules
define what actions should be taken by the various actuators
connected to the controller. Simply put, an event triggers a
rule and the rule triggers an action in an IoT system. The
controller decides what action or set of actions to take, as
defined by the rules installed in the controller. The controller
issues commands to the actuator for performing the most
appropriate action. The devices are connected through wired
or wireless networks.
The architecture of the IoTC2 is given in figure 1. All of
the rules/logic used for operation in each controller of the IoT
system are the input for IoTC2. Whenever there is a change
in any rule or an additional rule is added to a controller,
its inputted to IoTC2. The second type of inputs for our
framework is the sensor measurement with timestamps. To
start, our framework receives copies of the traffic from the
sensors to the controllers. As soon as IoTC2 receives the sensor
measurement, by using the rules/logic from the controller,
IoTC2 determines what actions the controller will emit for
the actuators. Next, IoTC2 determines the list of actuators,
affected features, and issuing controllers. Using these lists,
IoTC2 determines whether or not these activities violate the
safety properties (or create conflicts) within the IoT system.
IoTC2 has the capability to output the number of conflicts and
their type in the IoT system. In addition to conflict creating
events, misconfiguration of rules within an IoT system can lead
to a set of commands that can violate the safety properties of
the system which IoTC2 can also detect.
Fig. 1. IoTC2 Framework for Conflict Detection
III. FORMAL METHOD FOR DETECTING CONFLICTS
In this section, we present our formal method for detecting
safety property violations in IoT systems. In the following
description, we rely on the notation defined in Table I. We
start by defining some general properties of the IoT system
model, events, triggers, and actions.
Notation Explanation
eti Event i generated at time t
al,fm,n(t) Actuator m taking action n on feature f at location l
cp Controller p
x′ Object x′ can be the same or different from object x
x¯ Object x¯ must be different from x
TABLE I
NOTATION USED
Definition 1: If there are features fx and fy such that
changes in fx affect fy , then these features are dependent. It
can be the case that feature fx and feature fy are not directly
dependent, however feature fx affects fz and fz affects fy . In
this case, fy is indirectly dependent on fx. Regardless, they
are noted as:
fx
d
= fy (1)
Definition 2: If there are two events that are the same
or similar by their characteristics and functionality and they
occur within a bounded time frame, these events are called
overlapping events. They are noted as:
e1
o
= e2 (2)
Whenever two events are not overlapping, they are considered
disjoint events.
A. Controller Safety Policies
The controller is a crucial component of an IoT system that
receives measurements from sensors and based on those mea-
surements, it generates actuation commands for the appropriate
actuators. We define the controller safety policies as follows:
• There are no two rules where two or more controllers can
trigger the same actuator at the same time.
C1 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm∈cp,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ al,f
′
m∈cp¯,n′)) (3)
An IoT system has number of rules for operating where
the same actuator m is controlled by more than one
controller cp and cp¯. If the same actuator is accessed at
the same time t, a conflict occurs. The actions (denoted
by subscript n and n′) on the actuators can be same or
different, which does not change this policy. The affected
features in this case are made different (superscript f
and f ′) because the difference does not impact the safety
policy. The impact of the potentially different features
in creating conflicts is discussed in Section IV. The
following are examples of conflict scenarios that can be
captured by this rule.
– A smoke detector and a water-leak detector can
each trigger an alarm. We assume that the smoke
detector and water-leak detectors are controlled by
different controllers. But if the same alarm sounds at
the same time, it will be hard to distinguish which
event triggered the alarm. The policy formalized here
restricts multiple controllers from triggering the same
action at the same time.
– Motion detected inside an elevator triggers the con-
troller to prevent the elevator door from locking. On
the other hand, an alarm in the building will lock
the door of the elevator so that no one can use it
during the alarm. Here, the door of the elevator is
the actuator while the action on it is operated by
two controllers.
• There are no two rules where two controllers can trigger
actions that affect the same, or dependent, features at the
same time.
C2 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm∈cp,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ al,f
′
m′∈cp¯,n′)
∧ (f = f ′ ∨ f d= f ′))
(4)
There can be more than one rule that can trigger dif-
ferent actions (the subscript m and m′ denote different
actuators). However, these different actuators can impact
the same, or dependent features. The same features are
identified with ’=’ . On the other hand, the notion d=
denotes the dependency among two features f and f ′.
An example of such violation a is:
– A window opener and a thermostat can be two
different actuators controlled by different controllers,
but can affect the same feature (temperature) of the
room.
B. Multiple Action Trigger Policies
When an actuator is issued commands to perform multiple
actions at the same time, conflicts can occur. In order to
prevent conflicts, we have the following safety property:
• There are no two rules where two or more overlapping
events (from any sensor) can trigger multiple actions on
the same actuator.
– Different action n′
– Opposite action n¯
– Dependent action nˆ
C3 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ (al,f
′
m,nˆ ∧ al,f
′
m,n∗ ∧ al,f
′
m,n¯))
∧(i o= i′))
(5)
In this formula, two events are differentiated by the sub-
script i and i′. The measurement of a sensor can trigger an
event depending on whether that measurement is ’more
than’ or ’less than’ or ’equal to’ a pre-specified value.
We define overlapping events as two or more events that
occur within a specific time frame, or are related by their
signature. The overlapping relation between two events i
and i′ is denoted by i o= i′. These overlapping events
can trigger different actions (e.g. increase temperature
or decrease temperature), opposite action (e.g. open the
door and close the door), dependent action (beeping and
flashing light on an alarm) and the same but overlapping
action (increase temperature on a thermostat twice within
5 second). An action n on actuator m is the reference
action and any action (n′, n¯, or nˆ) other than n is
considered as the conflicting action on the same actuator
m. An example of this safety policy violation is given
below:
– Both room one and room two have temperature sen-
sors but no thermostat. The corridor that joins both
room has a thermostat, but no sensor. Temperature
decreases in room one and temperature increases in
room two can trigger the same thermostat. Hence,
the thermostat can be triggered to increase the tem-
perature and decrease the temperature at the same
time.
• There are no two rules where overlapping events can
trigger actions that affect the same or dependent features.
C4 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ al,f
′
m,n¯)
∧(i o= i′) ∧ ((f = f ′) ∨ (f d= f ′)))
(6)
When an action is performed by an IoT device, it may
affect one or more features (e.g. temperature, humidity, or
luminance). There are some features the actuators affect
directly while some features are impacted indirectly. As
an example, humidity and temperature can be considered
as dependent features [3]. When the temperature goes up,
it affects the humidity of a room if no moisture is added.
This is because warm air can hold more water vapor than
cool air. We differentiate two features by f and f ′. There
can be two rules that get activated at the same time by
two overlapping events, resulting in two different actions,
n and n¯. These two actions affect features f and f ′
which are either the same or dependent. The following are
examples of conflicts when this safety policy is violated:
– Room one and room two have a shared thermostat
in room one. Hence, room one gets hotter than room
two when the thermostat is turned on. Based on the
temperature reading from room one, the thermostat is
asked to turn off. However, the temperature measure-
ment from room two will ask the controller to turn on
the thermostat again. As mentioned earlier, temper-
ature and humidity are dependent and therefore it is
possible that humidity in two room will vary. If both
rooms share a humidifier that is placed in room 2, the
overlapping events can turn the humidifier on or off
simultaneously. Apart from depending environment
features being affected, more energy is needed for
additional actuations.
– Luminance level can be impacted by overlapping
events. Window blind and room lights are two dif-
ferent actuators that impact luminance.
• No two or more completely disjoint events can trigger
multiple action on the same actuators
C5 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ (al,f
′
m,nˆ ∨ al,f
′
m,n∗ ∨ al,f
′
m,n¯))
∧¬(i o= i′)))
(7)
In a large IoT system, it is not easy to distinguish over-
lapping events. Hence, we turn our attention to modeling
the safety properties that are based on disjoint events.
It is possible that these disjoint events are overlooked
when devising the IoT operational rules, yet these rules
can create conflicts within a single actuator. Examples for
such conflicts are:
– Management can impose a rule stating that when it
is after 6 pm, the temperature need not be controlled.
This means that the temperature of a smart building
will follow the basic thermal model of the building.
On the other hand, movement in a room will trigger
the thermostat to increase/decrease the temperature
for better occupant comfort.
– Smoke detection and carbon monoxide detection can
be two completely disjoint event that trigger multiple
alarms to sound at the same time.
• No two completely disjoint events can trigger multiple
actions that affect the same, or dependent features.
C6 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm,n) ∧ (eti′ ⇒ al,f
′
m,n¯) ∧ ¬(i o= i′)
∧((f = f ′) ∨ (f d= f ′)))
(8)
Two rules can be triggered by completely disjoint events
at the same time. The actuator and its location are kept
unchanged by notation m and l, respectively. The actions
are differentiated by n and n′. At the same location and
with the same actuator, two features f and f ′ got affected.
When these two features are dependent, f d= f ′ will
return true.
– A window opening or closing and a thermostat
turning on or off are two completely disjoint events
that impact the temperature of the room
– Management can impose a rule that when it is after 6
pm, the thermostat and the humidifier should not be
adjusted. On the other hand, movement in a room
will trigger the thermostat to increase/decrease the
temperature for better comfort. This has affect on
humidity as these two features are dependent.
C. Multiple Event Handling Policies
A controller actuates an IoT device when an event occurs.
There is relatively little control over how and when an event
is generated. However, the way multiple events are handled,
can be controlled. Therefore, we focus on formalizing event
handling policies. The formalization is as follows:
• No single sensor with single objective can create more
than one event within a specific time limit.
C7 : ¬((eti ⇒ al,fm,n) ∧ (et¯j ⇒ al,fm,n)) (9)
Here, two events i and i′ are prohibited from same sensor
j within a time limit t′. A sensor might send the same
measurement to the controller more than once due to any
physical or communication issue. This should be handled
in a proper way so that same actions are not taken by the
same actuator.
A sensor can send same temperature measurement (e.g.
60F) twice to the controller within a 30 second interval.
The controller would instruct the thermostat to increase
the temperature by 10F each time it receives the input
from the sensor. Therefore, the temperature of the room
is increased to 80F.
D. Completeness of IoT Safety Properties
Definition 3: If an IoT system, comprised of sensors s1...m,
controllers cntrl1...n, and actuators a1...o, violates any safety
properties c1...p, a conflict c∗ ∈ Conflict has occurred.
Completeness means that you can prove anything that’s true.
In order to analyze the safety policies formalized above in
terms of controllers, triggered actions, and event handling,
the policies were implemented using Prolog. If there exists
a conflict c∗ ∈ Conflict in the IoT system operations, IoTC2
finds it using the backward chaining. Prolog querey evaluation
employs Selective Linear Definite-clause with Negation as
Failure SLDNF [4]. However, the Dept First Search (DFS)
strategy of Prolog makes it logically incomplete. With this
strategy, the search begins from one node and traverses a
single path to find the query answer, i.e. looking for conflicts.
Whenever a conflict is found in the search space Prolog does
not traverse that branch to find another conflict even if another
one exists.
We followed the way proposed by [5] where the built-in
dept-first search of Prolog was overruled. Rather, the imple-
mentation was based on iterative deepening of the query where
each recursive call takes place at the top level of a conditional.
In doing so, we have used tail-recursion. In each recursive call,
the number of actions triggered, or the controllers associated
with it, or the events that triggered the actions are stored in lists
listA, listC , and listE , respectively. In this way, the search
space is being completed in lists. Then this list is traversed
to find the conflicts in the system. Whenever, a resolution
refutation is found, our Prolog implementation finds it and
adds 0 (zero) to the accumulator rather than stopping the
search process on that node.
The iterative deepening strategy is potentially inefficient.
One could argue that the size of lists will grow unbounded.
However, we point out that the formulation for conflicts is
dependent on the specific time the event has occurred. Say
two actions a1 and a2 are triggered at the same actuator x at
time t1 and t2. A conflict C occurs if and only if t1 = t2.
These two actions cannot create conflicts on the same actuator
if they are triggered at different times. If there are total of m
automation/operational rules in all the controllers of an IoT
system, there can be at most n rules that are triggered at time
t and it is obvious that n << m.
E. Soundness of IoT Safety Properties
Definition 4: The safety properties of IoTC2 is sound, if for
all sensors s1...m, controllers cntrl1...n, and actuators a1...o, all
possible operations in the system are subset of the authorized
operations allowed by IoTC2.
With the definition of soundness from 4, we can conclude
that all safety properties, expressed in conjunctive normal form
(CNF) make it logically sound as given in 10.
Cf : C1 ∧ C2 ∧ C3 ∧ C4 ∧ C5 ∧ C6 ∧ C7 (10)
If there exists a conflict in the IoT system, yet IoTC2
cannot detect it, we call it unsound. As mentioned earlier,
IoTC2 is implemented in Prolog where it backtracks till it
finds the ground truth. The only way IoTC2 can fail, is that
the ground truth is corrupted or altered which is left out of
scope of this paper. If there exists any resolution refutation, our
implementation must find it because of the lists listA, listC ,
and listE used to avoid built-in DFS of Prolog programs.
If the soundness and completeness conditions fail for IoTC2,
the negation of Cf in 10 will provide us an example of
unsafe situation of the IoT system. More simply a conflict
has occurred.
IV. EVALUATION
For out evaluation, we created an IoT environment using
Matlab’s Simulink. We designed a house with three rooms
with corridors attaching each of the rooms. The thermal model
of the house was adapted from [6]. The rooms have facilities
for smoke detection, carbon monoxide detection, smart lights,
smart window shutters and blinds, smart doors, etc. Opera-
tional rules for automating these Iot devices are implemented
using appropriate Simulink blocks. We run each simulation
several times to observe whether IoTC2 can detect conflicts
in the smart house successfully. We have used the built-in
model verification blocks (e.g., Assertion, Check Dynamic
Gap, Check Dynamic Range, etc) of Simulink to help our
detection. IoTC2 outputs the total count of each different type
of detected conflict in a given simulation step. Not only are
the detected conflicts shown, but also their effects on features
or actuators.
First, we evaluate the effects of conflicts on actuators or
the environment feature. Later, we discuss how well IoTC2
can detect the conflict in a simulated environment. Our first
experiment was conducted to observe whether two different
actions on different actuators affect the same environmental
feature. A smart window shutter is sometimes operated by the
occupant with the help of an app from tablet or smart phone.
Similarly, the shutter is operated to keep open at different times
of the day. On the other hand, the smart home is automated to
turn the smart lights on whenever it finds movement in a room.
In our setup, the probability of both the opening up the window
shutter and turning on smart light was set as 0.10. The conflict
occurs during a split second of time when both window shutter
and smart light turns on or off together given that someone is
in the room. The luminance of the room then gets out of the
range (> 450 or < 200) compared to a comfortable luminance
range. The simulation was run for 500 units of time. We see
the the experimental observations in Figure 2. As can be seen
from the figure, the luminance of the room exceeds the set
bounds for a comfortable luminance level.
The second experiment measures the change in temperature
of a room when a smart window shutter keeps opening
at occupant’s preference. Like the previous experiment, the
window shutter can be opened from the occupant’s smart
phone or tablet. In addition to that, if carbon monoxide of
the house gets increased beyond a certain level, the smart
home can be instructed to open the windows immediately for
fresh air. This changes the temperature and humidity of the
inside of the house. We designed this scenario in our Simulink
environment and used the same thermal model of the house [6]
to get reasonable heat transfer from the outside environment.
The results of this experiment are shown in Figure 3. The blue
line indicates the expected temperature reading. However, the
red line in this figure indicates how much the temperature
reading deviates due to conflicts between the window shutter
opening and the thermostat operating rules. This can result in
more actuation of the thermostat which will be discussed later
in Figure 6(b).
The third experiment captures the impact on temperature
of a shared corridor between two rooms. The two rooms
are set to have different temperature based on the occupants’
preferences. Let us assume the corridor has the thermostat,
but no temperature sensor. On the other hand, both rooms
have individual sensors. We also assume that room one has
the window open which affects the normal temperature of the
room by lowering the ambient temperature of room one. On
the other hand, room two has no influence from the outside
environment, i.e. the window in room two is closed. However,
due to two different sensor measurements, the thermostat is
instructed to turn on and off more frequently than expected.
The temperature, as shown by the red line in Figure 4, is the
temperature of the corridor, calculated by Simulink. The blue
line is the temperature reading during different times from
room two. Our intuition says this blue line is supposed to be
the temperature reading of the corridor, but it is affected by
the temperature from the other room.
The fourth experiment characterizes how changes in one
environment feature can influence the another environment.
Here, we consider the fact that the temperature in a smart
home is dependent on thermal radiation and humidity as it is
mentioned in [3]. The humidity changes with the temperature
of the room. The temperature changes with thermostat and
humidifier. Also, the window shutter opening changes the
temperature and humidity of the room. The scenario described
above is tested and shown in Figure 5. The expected humidity
reading is shown by the blue line, while the real humidity
reading is shown by the red line. Events like the window
shutters opening and the humidifier running have caused
the temperature of the room to fluctuate. This deviation is
overlooked, yet creates discomfort for the occupants and more
energy usage due to additional actuation.
To this point, we have conducted our experiments to charac-
terize how different types of conflict can affect the actuators or
the environment features. Now, we move our focus on counting
the number of conflicts in a given time by varying different
parameters. First, we consider the case where the same alarm
(actuator) gets triggered when smoke is detected or a water
leak is detected. The rules for triggering an alarm in those
cases are installed in two different controllers. We consider the
probability of smoke detection = 5% and water leak detection
= 7% in each time unit. The simulation was run for 2000
time units. It is shown in Figure 6(a) that the same alarm gets
triggered by different events at the same time with the increase
of simulation time. Next, we increase both smoke detection
and water leak detection to 10% and find the increment in
total conflict count. This type of conflict should be considered
as an attacker can compromise only the water system, yet
convince the occupants of the smart home that the alarm is
due to a fire. That eventually can lead the occupants/target of
a smart home to leave the home.
In the next experiment, we count the number of times the
window shutters of the smart home are open and the thermostat
turns on at the same time. The impact of such conflicts is
shown in Figure 3. As can be in from Figure 6(b), the number
of conflicts increases when the window shutter is opened more
frequently.
Next, we considered humidity as a dependent feature of
temperature. The thermal model of the house is kept the
same. The humidity changes based on the temperature which
triggers the humidifier. The effect of conflicts in such case are
discussed in 5. First, we run the simulation as if the humidity
is not affected by temperature. Next, we re-run the simulation
with humidity being dependent on temperature. We count the
number of times the humidifier is turned on due to conflicts.
As can be seen in Figure 6(c) when there is more temperature
variation outside the smart home, the humidifier inside the
house gets turned on more often.
We have observed in Figure 2 how conflicting actions can
affect the same feature. We have seen that the luminance of the
room can exceed a comfortable range due to conflicting actions
between the smart lights and the smart window blinds. We next
count how many times this conflict happens over a specific
period of time. We set the probability of the window blinds
being opened to 2%. We then increased this probability while
keeping the probability of turning the light on constant (at
10%) which is reasonably low because if there is an occupant
and the window blinds are closed, then the smart lights will
turn on immediately. However, the purpose of this experiment
is to show that the luminance can get out of range even though
there is a low probability of conflicts. Figure 6(d) shows that
the luminance of the room gets out of range more frequently
when there is a greater chance of the window blinds being
opened, given that the smart light turned on at the same
moment. Similarly, some incidents were observed where a
room gets dark when both the window blinds and the smart
light turns off.
The next experiment measures the number of conflicts
between management rules and operational rules for an IoT
system. For a smart building, the management rules may state
that the thermostat is not active after 6pm. However, if there
are lots of people in a room with their mobile devices or
computers on, the temperature of the room will increase.
The regular operational rules will then tend to actuate the
thermostat to cool the room. Here, we run the simulation for
a room in two different ways simultaneously while keeping
all parameters same. In the first run, we consider that the
occupancy of a room has an effect on temperature and the
thermostat is actuated by following basic operational rules.
The second run assumes that room occupants and electronic
devices does not have a measurable impact on the tempera-
ture of the room and that the management rules dictate the
operation of the thermostat. Our goal is to observe whether
conflicting events cause more actuation of the thermostat. As
expected, more actuations of the thermostat are needed when
conflicts occur. The building management authorities either
overlook this additional actuation, or ignore the comfort of
the occupants. The additional number of actuations is shown
on Y-axis of Figure 6(e). This number increases when the
simulation is executed for a longer time.
The last experiment conducted, is very similar to the previ-
ous one. Here, the count of humidifier actuations is measured
due to conflicts between operational rules and management
rules. We counted the number of additional actuations needed
for the humidifier in the smart home. When there are more
number of occupants, the air quality degrades and the tem-
perature of the room changes as well. The humidifier turns
on to make the environment of the room more comfortable.
However, the management rule stipulates not turning on the
humidifier after certain time of the day (say 6 pm). There can
be conflicts between management rules and regular operational
rules based on occupancy of a room. Similar to the previous
experiment, we ran simultaneous experiments with different
assumptions. During the first run, we assume that room
occupancy has negligible impact on the humidity and that the
smart building will be operated based on the management
rules. For the other run, we make the opposite assumtion,
namely that the occupants in the room will have a measurable
impact on the humidity of the room. The results are shown in
Figure 6(f).
Fig. 2. Luminance range of a room when smart window blinder and smart
light are considered
Fig. 3. Effect on Temperature when thermostat and window shutter works at
the same time
V. RELATED WORK
Until today, most of the research efforts have been made
for management, efficiency, interoperability, and deployment
of IoT systems in the real world. Recently, confidentiality,
access control, privacy, and trust issues of IoT technology
have been discussed in [7]–[9]. The formalization of security
properties of an IoT system have rarely been addressed. In IoT-
SAT [10], a formal framework was proposed for security anal-
ysis based on device configurations, network topologies, user
policies, and IoT-specific attack surface. Recently, the work
by [11] proposes a verification framework with satisfiable
module theory (SMT) for a smart environment with respect
to event-condition-action (ECA). However, this research did
not propose either safety properties or address conflicts for the
smart environment. The work by [12] made an effort classify
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Fig. 4. Effect on temperature of the corridor when it is connected by two
rooms of different temperature
Fig. 5. Effect on Humidity when thermostat and window shutter combinedly
changes the temperature and humidity
conflicts into a set of finite categories. They specified the
relation among all building management rules and classified
all type of rule conflicts into five categories. Our approach is
quite different. Rather than classifying conflicts, we specified
safety properties for the components of IoT and the violation
of those properties leads to conflicts.
Some preliminary work in the areas of formal modeling
and verification for smart home [13], [14], intelligent trans-
portation system [15], and health Internet of Things [16] has
been done. The closest to this work in terms of detecting
conflicts are Depsys [17], and HomeOS [18]. Depsys specified
and detected conflicts after collecting the functionalities of
35 smart apps used in smart home. It detects the conflicts
after they have occurred and in order to solve the situation
priorities have been set to the apps so that no two apps can
access the same actuator. Our approach, on the other hand,
detects conflicts as soon as an event is generated which may
immediately cause an action or a set of actions that result in
conflicts. We have left the automated resolution of conflicts as
future work.
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Fig. 6. (a) Conflict count when the same alarm is triggered by multiple events, (b) Frequency of thermostat being actuated more than usual due to the
window being opened (c) Additional actuation count on the humidifier due to temperature difference in two adjacent rooms (d) Total count of the luminance
range exceeding the comfortable range due to conflicts (e) Additional count of the thermostat being actuated due to conflicts between management rules and
operational rules, (f) Additional frequency of humidifier being actuated due to conflicts between management rules and random occupancy.
VI. CONCLUSION
The conflicts that are possible in IoT system are often
overlooked both in the design phase and during operations.
IoT is an automated system and hence the accumulated effects
of conflicts on an environment feature or actuator can have
more effects initially anticipated. The safety and security of
IoT systems is largely dependent of its conflict-less behavior.
Hence, the safety properties we formalized in IoTC2 consider
conflicts as the preeminent threat to the safety and security of
IoT system. Furthermore, our model has shown how conflicts
can lead to additional actuations which eventually result in
more energy consumption. In addition to the contributions
mentioned above, we believe our proposed framework will
have significant impacts when employed in the policy monitor
block of ProvThings [19]. However, the enforcement of the
proposed safety policies for a system is an open challenge. The
implementation of an inlined reference monitor (IRM) [20]
for enforcing the safety policies of our framework is another
interesting research direction. IoT systems are emerging more
and more in our daily life, and mechanisms are needed to
ensure that these systems are safe, secure, and energy efficient
if IoT systems are to be widely deployed and accepted.
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